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LEGAL PROCEDURES AS FORMAL CONVERSATIONS:
CONTRACTING ON A PERFORMATIVE NETWORK
Sandra K. Dewitz
Ronald M. Ike
Graduate School of Business
The University of Texas, Austin

ABSTRACT
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is a telecommunications format that many view as the next major
productivity gain made possible by information technology. This paper discusses how our semantic,

procedure-oriented view of business transactions leads to a different kind of telecommunications system
-- a performative network. Viewing procedures as formal conversations, we present a representation
schema and grammar to model these conversations and initiate the development of a formal language
by which users can cooperate, negotiate, and make commitments over a performative network. Our
approach complements and extends EDI's syntactic, record-format orientation, seeking to express not

only the data transmitted through these transactions but also the semantics of the procedures

thennselves.
1.

INTRODUCTION

Lyytinen 1986; and Stamper and Lee, forthcoming, for a
discussion of information systems as social systems).

Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is changing the way
many businesses interact by speeding and simplifying the

We propose a formallanguage for business communication

exchange of common business documents (e.g., invoices,

(FLBC) that gives a formal semantics for the procedures.
A formal language employs a restricted vocabulary and
explicit rules to convey meaning; predicate logic and
programming languages such as COBOL and Pascal are

purchase orders). Through EDI, businesses such as IBM
and General Motors have established links with their
suppliers and dealers whereby raw materials are ordered
and product shipments are invoiced through electronic

examples of formal languages. Statements in a program-

networks. These networks instantly transmit information

ming language are imperative (i.e., commands that describe

from computer to computer in standardized digital formats,
allowing orders to be placed, confirmed, and billed in
moments rather than days. In addition to saving time,
companies that use EDI also make money by reducing
their paperwork and by processing orders more quickly.
The advantages of EDI have led one IBM marketing vice

actions for the computer to execute); statements in
predicate logic are declarative (i.e., assertions that can be

evaluated as true or false). The formal language presented
here includes both declarative statements, which describe
states and individuals, and performative statements, which
are linguistic actions performed by agents negotiating and
executing contracts. The development of a FLBC makes
feasible what we call a performative network -- an electronic network over which organizations can transact

president to say "Doing business without EDI will soon be
like trying to do business without the telephone" (Schatz
1988).

business through repeated and enduring communication.

As attractive as EDI is, we feel that its approach is
inherently limited -- limited primarily by its emphasis on
automating forms instead of automating the procedures
that use the forms. EDI developers start with a common

This paper defines our approach.

business document, for example, a purchase order; then
they establish low-level machine protocols -- in essence, a
syntax -- that will allow the data in the forms to be pro-

and inference rules of the formal language. Section 2
discusses performatives -- words that perform actions --

cessed by the receiving computer.

agents use language to make commitments and to transact
business. Section 3 illustrates the use of performatives to

Examining a small

fragment of contract law, we explain how legal procedures
can be modeled and begin to identify the syntax, semantics,

and places procedures in formal conversations in which

We contend that

development should begin with an understanding of the
procedures to be automated, with the purpose and meaning of these transactions. By adopting a more procedural,
semantic orientation, we hope to complement and extend
the promise of EDI and to address some of the problems
that arise when computers are used to perform social acts
(see Auramaki, Lehtinen and Lyytinen 1988; Lehtinen and

conduct formal conversations over a performative network.
Section 4 details our method of modeling formal conversa-

tions, and Section 5 presents a logic model of three
contracts under a fragment of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC). Section 6 discusses the implications of this
approach and future research.
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2.

PERFORMATIVES, DEONTIC STATES, AND
FORMAL CONVERSATIONS

legal speech acts create obligations, permissions, and prohibitions -- deontic states that are enforceable by law.
2.2 Deontic States Created by Legal Speech Acts

2.1 Perrormatives Defined

One of the characteristics that distinguish performative
speech acts from informative speech acts is the ability of
performative speech acts to change the state of the world.
Legal speech acts in commercial sales contracts obligate

Several authors have suggested that illocutionary logict can
serve as the basis of a formal language for business com-

munication (see McCarthy 1982; Kimbrough and Lee
1986). Illocutionary logic (Searle and Vanderveken 1985)

the contractual parties to perform the acts specified in

is an extension of Austin's (1975) speech act theory, which

their agreement. Thus, if a merchant offers to sell goods

contends that words can do more than just describe the
world. Words can be used to perform acts that change the
state of the world. Thus, a witness's uttering the words "I
swear to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth" in
a court of law is the act of swearing that the testimony
about to be given is truthful. Similarly, using the words
"XYZ Inc. offers to pay $56 per share of stock" performs
the legal act of offering to purchase stock. These words -whether spoken or written -- constitute performative
speech acts, which can be distinguished from informative
speech acts, or declarative statements, that only convey
information about the world (e.g., the words "Last week
XYZ Inc. offered to pay $56" describe but do not perform

at a certain price, the buyer's acceptance of this offer
obligates the merchant to perform a sales transaction.
Obligations, permissions, and prohibitions are deontic
states, derived from deontic logic, a form of predicate logic
concerned with normative concepts (see Allen 1982;

Casteneda 1982; von Wright 1968). These norms are
perfurmative prescriptions that change the state of affairs:
what was prohibited may now be permitted, or what was
discretionary may now be obligatory.
A change in state has three components: an initial state,
an intentional action that triggers a transition from one
state to another, and an end state, as shown in the statetransition diagram in Figure 1 (a). The initial state (State
1) is that party Y is prohibited from driving a car (deontic

a speech act).
Informative speech acts, being state descriptions, are evalu-

state is prohibition). When party
speech act of licensing Y to drive,
transition to the end state (State 2)
has permission to drive (deontic

ated as true or false. Performative speech acts, being actions, are evaluated as successful or unsuccessful. Austin

(1975) described a performative speech act as being"happily, successfully performed" if the speaker "secures uptake"

X performs the legal
that action marks the
in which party Y now
state is permission).

Similarly, in a contracting procedure, the legal speech acts

-- that is, if the speaker brings about an understanding of

of offering and accepting create a deontic state of obliga-

his intent in the mind of the hearer. Strawson (1964)

tion between the parties to the agreement, as shown in
Figure 1 (b). At State 1, no obligations exist between X
and Y. X's legal speech act of offering creates a deontic

qualified this requirement somewhat when he argued that
the intent to achieve the hearer's understanding may be

sufficient to perform a speech act, whether the desired

state (State 2) in which X is obligated to accept Y's
acceptance. Y's legal speech act of accepting creates a
deontic state (State 3) in which both parties are obligated

effect is achieved or not. The requirement for a successful
performative speech act in commercial sales law is that a

reasonable person in the hearer's position would have

to perform future actions, Actl and Act2. This ability to
use words to form commitments is a major component of

understood the language as expressing the intent claimed

for it.

our definition of a formal conversation.

The law has long recognized that performative speech acts

0

CD

(a)

are actions, not merely statements. For example, an objec-

license(X,Y,drive)

tive third party who witnesses the formation of an oral
agreement can testify that a contract was formed. In fact,
Tiersma (1986) points out that such evidence would stand
up in court because the law recognizes that uttering a per-

(b)

0
offer(X,Y,Actl,Actl)

a ccept(Y,X,A ct 1, Act 2)

formative verb is a deed. Testifying what someone said is
inadmissible, being hearsay evidence; however, testifying

what someone did in making a performative utterance is
admissible as evidence.

Figure 1:

State-Transition Diagrams of
Legal Speech Acts

Many of the words in legal procedures perform legal acts,
such as offering to sell goods, licensing someone to distrib-

23 Legal Procedures as Formal Conversations

ute a product, or accepting an offer. We call these legal

When business people cooperate to perform procedures,
the actions of each agent trigger and restrict the actions of
the other agents, each action creating a new state in which

speech acts. A legal speech act differs from an ordinary
speech act in that it invokes the rules and conventions of
the law and carries with it a certain legal force. That is,

a limited set of subsequent actions is appropriate (Searle
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and Vanderveken 1985; Winograd and Flores 1986). When
rules and conventions govern the actions of agents who use

must be represented so that we can infer the status of the

words to form commitments, the procedures in this largely
linguistic interaction constitute a formal conversation.

mine if a contract has been successfully completed, if it is

formal conversation. That is, we must be able to deter-

pending, or if one of the parties has failed to fulfill a legal
obligation within the allotted time.

Our concept of a formal conversation brings together
several views of linguistic interaction. From Searle and

A second issue in formal conversations is the competence
of the participants. Because the expressions used in formal

Vanderveken (1985), we derive the notion of a conversa-

tion as "ordered speech act sequences that constitute
arguments, discussions, buying and selling." From Ma-

conversations are speech acts, they presuppose "the
mastery of a certain game in which the expression...has a
role" (Hintikka 1979); they presuppose that each participant in the formal conversation understands the rules and
conventions that determine how the procedure is enacted.
The rules governing legal procedures include stipulations
about the capacity and intent of the parties involved, the
purpose of the conversation, and the meaning of words
within the conversation.

turana (1978), we adopt the idea of a "consensual domain"

in which agents share a common language that evolves
through their activities in that domain. Few professions or
trades have evolved a more elaborate language than the
legal profession; legal language is, in essence, a quasi-

formal language whose word meanings are fixed by
common use among participants in the legal consensual

domain. Formal conversations also emphasize "conversations for action" (Flores and Ludlow 1981; Winograd and
Flores 1986) in which agents use language to form commit-

For example, if Alpha says to Beta that he will pay $5000
for Delta's car, has Alpha offered to buy Delta's car? No,

ments.

because the rules governing the"game" of contract negotia-

Formal conversations may be viewed as a kind of"language

tion dictate that the offerer (Alpha) must make the offer
to the offeree (Delta), the legal owner of the car. However, if Beta is the legally appointed agent of Delta (for
example, if Beta is a car dealer or a friend whom Delta has
appointed to sell his car), then Alpha has made an offer
and is bound to buy Delta's car if Beta accepts the offer.
But, if Alpha is a legal minor or is legally insane, Alpha's

game" (Wittgenstein 1963): A language game is a special

context in which the use of language is governed by
conventions. To understand the meaning of words in a
language game, one must first understand the rules and
conventions that determine how the "game" is played. In
fact, the context or language game often provides the
criteria for using a word; it defines "the normative aspects
of certain linguistic conventions" (Fodor 1967) that deter-

mine what an expression denotes in that game.

offer is voidable at his option since, according to legal rules
and conventions, Alpha does not have the capacity to form
a contract.

For

example, in contract law, different terms share a common
meaning: convey, transfer,
negotiate, assig,1, and
delegate are legal speech acts that bring about a change
in ownership. The attribute that distinguishes one of these
legal speech acts from another is the object of the ownership change, in essence, the context of the use of the word.
Thus, one conveys real estate, transfen

In essence, the law requires that participants in legal
procedures have some degree of what Hintikka called
"mastery of...[the] game" they are playing. Not only does
contract law stipulate that contracts made by legal minors

tangible personal

and by the legally insane are voidable, it also protects
poorly informed consumers by rendering unenforceable a

property,negotiates commercial paper, assigns contractuat rights, and delegates contractual duties.

contract that takes advantage of a consumer's inability to
understand the language of the agreement (what the law
calls an unconscionable contract; see e.g., UCC, Section 2302). Thus, formal conversations in contract law are
governed by rules and conventions about how the parties
should conduct themselves and about what constitutes an

With this background we can now give a full definition of

formal conversation: an ordered sequence of speech acts
performed by agents who share a common language and
follow prescribed rules and conventions in order to form
commitments. As this definition suggests, the timing and

enforceable legal speech act.

sequencing of speech acts matter. Each speech act is an
event that must occur in a prescribed order or on, by, or

Offering and counter-offering, accepting and rejecting are
all rule-governed legal speech acts within the formal

within a certain time. For example, in the legal procedure

of forming a sales contract, an offer must precede an
acceptance. Similarly, the time frame of the acceptance
may be restricted: the terms of the offer may stipulate that

conversation of contracting. When one uses these words
in other conversations, their effect may not be the same.
When a motorist whose car has stalled in rush-hour traffic
says, "I'll sell this car to the first person who offers me a

it will expire if not accepted within ten days.

Because timing and sequencing matter, our formal language must employ aspects of temporal logic to represent

nickel for it," his words are not to be construed as a
binding offer. The circumstance of being stranded on a
freeway and the role of irate motorist are not an adequate
enabling context for a formal conversation! Thus, the

and reason about time. Both absolute time (e.g., January
1,1999) and relative time (e.g., event A precedes event B)
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words alone are not binding; only in their "role within a

its members: for example, electronic shopping (see Lee

certain set of social conventions or rules" (Kimbrough, Lee,

and Widmeyer 1986) and electronic contracting (see Lte

and Ness 1984) -- within a well-defined formal conversation
-- do these words constitute a legal speech act capable of

1988). The performative network that we envision for
electronic contracting can also monitor the fulfillment of
agents' commitments. An example of a contracting pro-

obligating the parties.

cedure executed over a performative network will clarify
In fact, in a well-defined context where the roles of the
parties are clearly delineated, the parties can form a

how the network would work.

commitment even by using an indirect speech act, one
which contains no performative verb but which implies a
performative utterance. Tiersma provides an excellent
example of the cruciality of the context in which a performative speech act occurs:

3.1 A Contracting Scenario

Our example describes a sale on approval in which a
merchant allows a customer to examine and to "try out"
goods during a trial period. Assume that Smith, a merchant, and Jones, a customer, are both subscribers on the

network.
software,
describes
price and

There are numerous cases in which the word
"offer" was not used, but courts nonetheless found
a binding commitment. Embo, v. Hagadine,
McKimick Do; Goods CO. involved a worker
whose employment contract expired at the end of

Smith, who develops and sells small business
logs on the network and places an ad that
the programs currently available, giving their
the terms of sale. The terms of sale stipulate

that a customer may copy the software to his file space on
the network and try it at no charge for 48 hours.

the year. On December 23, he went to his boss
to ask for a renewal of the contract. His employer
replied, "Go ahead, you're all right; get your men
out and don't let that worry you." The court held
that the employer had assented to the terms of a
bargain. (Tiersma 1986, p. 192)

Jones reads Smith's ad and decides to try one of Smith's
accounting packages. Jones executes the appropriate
command to indicate that he wishes to enter a sale on

In this case, the roles of employer and employee and the

by posting a record to its database, noting that Smith has

circumstance of forming an employment contract are very

bailed (given temporary possession of) an accounting

clearly defined; any reasonable person in the employee's
position would have assumed that the employer intended
to renew the contract.

software package to Jones. Then the network copies the
accounting program to Jones' file space.

While browsing through the "For Sale" ads on the network,

approval with Smith. The network records this transaction

If Jones decides to buy the software, he signals his acceptance by remitting payment to Smith through an electronic

What this tells us about the performative network is that

The
network, acting as monitor, records this transaction and
completes the sale by authorizing Jones to download the
software program to his own system and by issuing a
registration number for Jones' copy (that registration
number being the equivalent of a document of title or

funds transfer within the 48-hour trial period.

it must be governed by explicit rules stipulating when and
how words from the formal language can be used and what
meaning the legal speech acts convey in that context. An

umbrella contract, which all participants on the network

would be required to sign, could define the rules for
conducting conversations on the network, thereby defining

license). The network may also notify Smith to send Jones
backup copies of the program diskette(s) and a hardcopy

the conventions that govern how the legal speech acts are

interpreted.

of the user manual through express mail delivery.

3.

CONDUCTING FORMAL CONVERSATIONS ON A
PERFORMATIVE NETWORK

If Jones decides not to buy the software, he is obligated to
log on the network and execute a statement signalling his

rejection before the 48-hour trial period has elapsed.
Given the framework provided by Section 2, we can now '
describe a performative network more fully. A perfor-

Executing the rejection command causes the network to
erase the accounting program from Jones' network file

mative network is a telecommunications system that

space. If Jones does nothing (i.e., neither remits payment

supports the formation of commitments between agents by

nor signals his rejection), the system infers that he has
accepted the software by default and posts a record of
Jones' payment obligation to Smith's transaction file.

providing a formal language by which they can perform
legal speech acts. What makes a network performative is

a set of assumptions about its use. For example, an A™

3.2 Informative versus Performative Networks:
Legal Issues

(automatic teller machine) network is performative in the

sense that it provides a formal system whereby users
perform the legal speech acts of withdrawing and deposit-

may provide a meeting place, a kind of trading room floor

From this example, one sees that both Electronic Data
Interchange and the performative network support the

or market place, that imposes certain rules of discourse on

transmission of data from computer to computer. Howev-

ing money. In other applications, a performative network
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er, what makes our approach different is its focus on
procedures and its performative framework. Unlike EDI,

the act of signing a document or mailing a letter containing
an offer or acceptance. Just as an offer to buy conveyed

in which the "negotiation of terms and conditions should
be resolved prior to" logging on a network to transmit the

in a letter is activated at the moment the letter is placed
in a mailbox (the "mailbox rule"), a legal speech act could
be seen as activated the moment the appropriate command
is executed on the network. Thus, in our scenario, Jones'
executing the command for entering a sale on approval is
an affirmative act that signals his acceptance of the terms
of the sale and that commits him to either accept and pay
for the software or explicitly reject it within the 48-hour
trial period.

"highly formatted, standardized, and automated" data
(Baum, Boss and Fry 1988, p. 18), the performative
network can support human agents as they form agreements. For example, Jones could reject Smith's price term
and offer to pay $250 for the software instead of the $295
that Smith is asking. Then Smith could accept or reject

Jones' offer, acceptance leading to the transaction described above.

4.

An informative network (e.g., the Dow-Jones News
Retrieval service or any other application that provides
information to subscribers) merely describes the states of
participants and objects. In contrast, a performative
network actually supports the performance of acts that
change the status of the participants. On an informative
network, unauthorized access is the primary security

MODELING FORMAL CONVERSATIONS

Developing a performative network requires an in-depth
understanding of the formal conversations to be conducted
on the network. We must understand both the sequence
of actions within these conversations and the obligations

they create.

concern; third parties must be prevented from accessing or

In this section we give a representation

schema for modeling the events in formal conversations
(sce Lee and Ryu 1989 for a fuller discussion). The events

altering the information on the network, data integrity
being the paramount concern. In contrast, on a performa-

are performative (legal) speech acts that bring about

tive network, forgery and fraud pose the greatest security

commitments. In all cases, the timing and the sequencing
of events are crucial to the satisfactory completion of the
formal conversation. We represent these temporal aspects
in two formal notations: an event grammar that provides

risks. Verifying the legitimacy of the acts requires verification of the agent's identity: that it was Smith who made

the offer and Jones who accepted the goods. It also
requires irrefutable evidence that the act itself was performed: that Smith tendered delivery of the accounting
software or that Jones signalled his rejection within the

a linear model of the formal conversation and an event net
that models the conversation graphically.

trial period. These security issues have been addressed
elsewhere (see Baum, Boss and Fry 1988; Kahn, Vezza and

4.1 Predicate Logic and Temporality

Roth 1981) in discussions of authenticity guarantees such
In predicate logic, problem domains are modeled using
predicates denoted as predicate constants followed by an
argument list: for example, (cti,a2,a<3,...0j. The arguments may be simple variables or constants representing
individuals, or they may be complex structures called

as time stamping, receipt verification, and encryption.
Nonetheless, a major barrier to developing a performative

network is satisfying the Uniform Commercial Code's
requirement that, to be enforceable, a sales contract for

goods in excess of $500 must be evidenced by a signed
writing. A writing can be "any..intentional reduction to

functions. This predicate represents a static relationship;

however, because we are modeling procedures, we must
assume that a relationship is not permanent, that it may
change as the procedure progresses. Typically we will be
most concerned with the moment when a predicate
commences, that commencement signalling what we call an

tangible form" (UCC, Section 1-201 (46)); a signature can
be any symbol used by a party "with the present intention

to authenticate" (UCC, Section 1-201 (39)) the form to
which it is applied. Although neither a paper document
nor a hand-written signature is specifically required under
the UCC, it is unclear just how electronic technology can
satisfy the requirement of a "signed writing." A task force
on electronic messaging services, commissioned by the

event. (We refer to the moment when a predicate ceases
to be true as the commencement of its negation.)

To model procedures more fully, we add two components
to the standard predicate notation: First, we distinguish

American Bar Association, has recommended that this
requirement be dropped or that the UCC be supplemented

event predicates from ordinary predicates by prefixing a

with explicit statements approving an electronic equivalent

colon (:) to the event predicate: for example,

of a signed writing (Baum, Boss and Fry 1988). Since the
UCC already recognizes the legal force of a telegram and

: (1)(ai, 12,C'4,···Cn

of a telex, designating rules for satisfying the signed writing
requirement on a performative network is entirely feasible.

The colon signifies that the state described by the predicate
"occurs" or "is brought about." A second concept that our

One way to overcome this impediment is to construe the
execution of a performative statement on the network as
an "affirmative act" (Baum, Boss and Fry 1988) similar to

notation must capture is that of an agent responsible for
the occurrence of the event. Although agency could be
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4.2 Event Nets

represented as an additional argument within the predicate,

its importance to organizational modeling requires that we
explicitly identify the agent: for example, B: *, where B

An event net is a modification of a state-transition network
extended to incorporate limited types of concurrency
between events. This notation is somewhat less versatile
than a Petri Net, but its notation is much more compact.
An event net consists of nodes, drawn as circles, and
directed arcs, drawn as arrows. Arcs are labelled with
event predicates or the name of a subgraph in subroutine
fashion. Each subgraph may have only one starting node,
the starting node's label serving as the name of the
subgraph. Concurrent events are represented as parallel

identifies the person, role, or department responsible for

bringing about the event +. In this notation, ':' is, in effect,
a higher order predicate that associates an agent with an
event; thus, jones : payment(smith, $ 295) indicates that
Jones brings about a payment to Smith of $295. Generic

actions may be described using variables; X: A indicates
that party X brings about event A.
Events will normally be regarded as occurring at a point
in time. If the process that brings about an event is an
activity having duration (e.g., building a house),the point
event is the completion of the activity. We use an elemen-

arcs enclosed by vertical bars: the first bar indicates the

beginning of the concurrent events, and the second
indicates their completion, as shown in Figure 2.

tary form of temporal logic to reason about the occurrence
of events in time and about deadlines for actions.4 Since
B:iccip¢(S,Goodi,

the calendar is the principal framework for temporal

-a_...tract)

references, we adopt calendar dates as the basic temporal
entity.

S:.rfer(B.Go•ds.
soa_cem¢ract)

The notation for dates is < day> - < month > -

I

,

S:b,11(B.Goods,

III_coil/act} .

.I,M. 2 d.,I «D I'lhai 1 d Cule

D

0-4

< year >, for example, 6-feb-1989. An action is associated
with a particular date by means of temporal operators:

S:teider_dellver,(B,Goods,
.0,-contract) -

D

00 //1

8:Iccept (S.Goidi,

< action> on < date > =
an action performed on a certain date

sea_€01/.c¢)
within 2 days

<action> by <date> =

Figure 2: Event Net of a Sale on Approval Contract

an action performed on or before a certain date

This event net represents a contracting procedure that
begins with two concurrent activities: a seller S brings
about an offer to sell goods to a buyer B by creating a

Relative times can be specified by using < action > within
< integer > days, indicating that the action is to be per-

formed within the specified number of days from the
preceding state. In addition, our notation can indicate that

bailment (giving temporary possession of) the goods to the
buyer. At State 2, the buyer B can either accept the goods
by paying for them or reject the goods by returning them
to the seller. If the buyer accepts the goods, a third state

a deadline has not been met; this involves a special form
of negation that we call temporal negation: -X:A by D.

(State 3) arises in which the seller is obligated to tender
delivery of the goods by giving the seller a document of

We use the negation sign (-) to indicate that an agent X

fails to bring about an event A by the deadline D. Similar
usage applies to the on and within constructs. Temporal
negation differs from ordinary negation in that it refers to
the non-fulfillment of a deadline. A promised action has

a threefold status:

title. In this situation, the procedure culminates in a
completed sales transaction. If the buyer rejects the goods,
the procedure ends with no sale.

completed (on time), pending (not

completed, but deadline has not yet passed), or breached

(not completed and deadline has passed). Temporal
negation is a test used to identify when a breach has
occurred.

43 Event Grammars

We represent the relative sequencing of events as event

again in an effort to economize on notation while representing concurrency where necessary. In fact, event
grammar rules are compiled into Petri net transition rules
of the form

Like event nets, event grammars are intermediate to statetransition diagrams and Petri nets in their expressiveness,

grammars, which have both a graphical and a linear
notation. Event grammars are so named because their
linear notation is much like the definite clause grammars
used to parse natural language. However, rather than

parsing sequences ofwords, event grammars parse (histori-

trans([< input places>], [< output places>], < action >).

cal) sequences of events. In our applications, these events
are typically linguistic events involving performative speech

acts.

Thus, the procedural reasoning is done within conventional
predicate logic using predicates of this form.

Thus, event grammars describe the permissible

sequence of speech acts in a formal conversation. Section

The linear notation of event grammars is a series of rules

4.2 discusses how these sequences are represented as event
nets; Section 4.3 gives the linear event grammar notation.

having the general form ¢ = = > Yl, 92, Y3,···Yn· Each yi is
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Sale on approval: a contract in which the seller
bails goods to the potential buyer with the under-

an event predicate, which may be an atomic action, as in
the notation described earlier, or a non-atomic action that

is further defined by subsequent rules. The comma
between event predicates indicates temporal sequence, not
logical conjunction. An event grammar rule is read "Event

standing that the buyer must accept (i.e., pay for)
the goods or reject them within a certain time
period.

+ is recognized if event yi is recognized, and next event Y2
is recognized, and next ..., and next event Yn is recognized."
Event grammars can express limited concurrency. Corre-

As the explanations of these contracts suggest, the vocabu-

sponding to the vertical bars of the event net are the
square brackets used in event grammars; for example,

precise meaning of several legal terms and concepts. A
major task in developing a formal language is identifying

[A,B] mdicates that A precedes B or vice-versa. Thus, the

the ontology of the discourse domain in which the language

lary of our formal language must correctly denote the

is to be used. The ontology describes the entities that exist
in the domain being modeled. The ontology for this

expression P = = > [A,B] is equivalent to P = = > A,B and

P= = > BA. Using this notation, the event net of Figure
2 can be represented by the following event grammar

fragment of commercial sales law includes the entities
shown in Figure 3.

rule:5
sak_on approval = = >

[S'.offer(B,Goods,soa contract-1) on D,
B:accept(S,Goods,soa contract-1) within 2 days.

PLAYERS are the participants in the formal conversation,
the parties involved in the contract. In the contracts

S:tender_delivery(S,GBods,soa_contract-1) within 1 day

modeled here, the players include a merchant, a carrier (a

S:bail(B,Goods,soajontract-1) on D],

delivery service, whether Federal Express, Union Pacific
Railroad, or Bob's Trucking), and a customer. In other
5.

A FORMAL LANGUAGE FOR CONTRACTING

kinds of contracts, the players might include a cosigner, a

The previous section explained our notation for representing events in formal conversations. In this section we build
on the event grammar notation to develop a logic model

Players fill the agent role described in our event grammar
notation. They are entities in the domain of discourse as
well as users of the performative network; that is, these

financing institution, a notary, witnesses, and others.

of formal conversations under a fragment of the Uniform

players use the formal language provided by the performa-

Commercial Code. We also outline the syntax and seman-

tive network to form commitments.

tics of a formal language that can be used to conduct and
to monitor these conversations.

ACTS are the linguistic actions the players perform in
order to conduct a formal conversation. Some of these

We use the framework of denotational semantics in which

a formal language is defined by identifying its ontology

legal speech acts are performed on paper. For example,

(the primitive entities in the domain being modeled) and
by specifying a vocabulary and formation rules for building
complex structures from these entities.6 The meaning of

a tender of delivery involves providing the buyer with a
document of title that gives the buyer legal ownership of
the contractual goods. Documents of title include a bill
of lading (used when the merchant arranges delivery of
goods through a carrier) and a warehouse receipt (used

every well-formed sentence is given in the semantics, which

describes the way the world would have to be for each
sentence to be true. Because our model must support

when the customer picks up the goods from a warehouse).
One of the legal speech acts, accept, can be realized by the

inferencing about the status of the formal conversation, we

also provide inference rules to evaluate and to monitor that

absence of action. By not explicitly rejecting goods in a
sale on approval, a customer accepts them, his silence
obligating him to pay the merchant the full price of the
goods. Our earlier scenario of Jones' accepting the accounting software by failing to reject it within the 48-hour
trial period is an example of silence being construed as a
legal speech act in the appropriate context.

status.

5.1 A Fragment of Commercial Sales Contract Law

Our logic model describes formal conversations conducted
to form and to execute three relatively simple sales
contracts.

GOODS are the contractual objects of interest. Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, goods include "all things...

Shipment contract: a contract in which the seller

which are movable at the time of identification to the

tenders delivery of goods by bailing them to a
carrier who, in turn, transports them to a place

contract for sale other than the money in which the price

is to be paid, investment securities...and things in action"
(Section 2-105(1)).
More specifically, the contracts

specified by the buyer.

modeled here cover only those goods purchased for
Destination contract:

a contract in which the

personal or business use (i.e., real estate transactions,

seller bails goods to a carrier and tenders delivery
of those goods at a place specified by the buyer.

which involve real property, not goods, are outside the
scope of the UCC).
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DOMAIN = PLAYERS U ACTS U GOODS U DATES U CONTRACTS where

PLAYERS = {X: X is a merchant} U {X: X is a carrier} U {X: X is a customer}

ACTS = {offer, accept, tender_delivery, bail, reject} where
offer:

A merchant (customer) offers to sell (buy) goods at a certain price. The

offeree's acceptance obligates the offerer to perform the act offered.

accept: An offeree accepts an offer by agreeing to its terms, thereby being
obligated to perform certain acts. In a sale on approval, a customer accepts goods

either by failing to reject them within the trial period or by remitting payment to
the merchant within the trial period.

tender delivery: A merchant tenders delivery of goods to a customer by
giving the customer a document of title to those goods.

bail: A merchant bails goods by giving temporary possession of those goods to

-a carrier for delivery to a customer or
-a customer in a sale on approval.
reject: A customer rejects goods in a sale on approval by returning them to the
merchant within the trial period; an offeree rejects an offer by refusing to accept
the offerer's terms.

GOODS = {X: X is a tangible, movable object}
DATES = {X-Y-Z: X-Y-Z is a calendar date where X is an integer 1-31, Y is an element
in {jan, feb, mar, dec}, and Z is a four-digit integer}

CONTRACTS = {X : X is a contract}

Figure 3: Ontology of a Fragment of
Commercial Sales Law
fur example, d_contract-1 individuates a particular destina-

When contracts refer to specific times for action, DATES
are an important entity. The UCC adheres to the concept
of "reasonable definiteness," which requires only that a
contract "possess sufficient certainty to enable a court to

tion contract. Individuation becomes especially important
when there is no physical document to provide a permanent, tangible record of the agreement. Lee (1984) describes the role of a neutral third party -- in our scenario,
the performative network itself -- which individuates the

determine the rights and obligations of the parties"
(Howell, Allison, and Prentice 1988, p. 1400). When a

agreements and guards against illegal reproduction.

date or time period for action is not specified in the
contract, a "reasonable time" is inferred by studying the

circumstances of the current and other similar agreements.
Our model assumes that specific dates or relative times for

5.2 Formation Rules

performance are given so that we can avoid this fuzziness
as we evaluate the status of the contract. Future research

The entities defined in Figure 3 combine to form the

will add the features necessary to support inferences about

sentences of the formal language. The formal language
contains two kinds of statements: performative statements

"reasonable time."

and declarative statements.

Performative statements

consist of the legal speech acts that players use to engage

CONTRACTS are the agreements formed by the Players.

in formal conversations.

Each is uniquely identified by its contract type (s_contract,

events that succeed (are realized and become part of a
database of historical events) or fail (are not performed

d_contract, or soa_contract) and by an index on each type;
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Performative statements are

<formal_conversation>::= <performative_statement> I <performative_statement>,
<fomnal_conversation>
<performative_statemenD ::=kplayer_name>: <action> <temporaLexpression>
(Each performative_statement is an event. Realized events are given as
facts in the data base;generic events that contain variables are used

to infer states.)

<action> ::= <act>(<player_name>, <goods>, <contracUd>)
<act> ::= offer ltender_delivery lbail I accept lreject

<player_name> ::= <atom>
<goods>::= <atom>
<contractid>::= <contracLtype> - <contrac:Lindex>

<contracuype> ::= d_contract I s_contract I soa_contract
<contracUndex>::= <integer>

<temporal_expression> ::= on <date> I by <date> I within <integet> days
<date> -=<day>-<month><yea
(The following expressions are declarative statements used to describe
the status of a contract and of the parties to the contract)

<obligation_expression>::= obligation(<performative_statement>)
<pending-expression>::= pending(<contracUd>, <date>)

<breach_expression>::= breach( <contracUd>, <date>)
<completed_expression>::= completed( <contract_id>, <date>)
<title_expression>::= has_title(<player_name>, <contracUd>,<date>).
<risk_expression>::= bears-risk(<player-name>, <contracLid>, <date>),

Figure 4: Formation Rules of the Formal Language
statement followed by a formal conversation. Our forma-

correctly and therefore do not become part of the data
base). The formation rules for formal conversations and
performative statements are given in BNF notation:

tion rule for a performative statement is the event gram-

mar notation wherein an agent (<player_name>) brings
about (:) an event ( < action>) on, within, or by a certain

time ( < temporal expression>). This notation was dis-

<formal conversation> ::= <performative_statement> 1
< peRormative_statement>,< formalconversation>

cussed in detail in Section 4, so we will not elaborate on
it here.

<performative_statement>::= < player_name > :

Declarative statements describe the status of the formal
conversation and the players within the conversation.

< action > < temporalexpression>

States are inferred by applying inference rules (discussed
in Section 5.3) to the database of events. Figure 4 gives

Thus, a formal conversation is defined recursively as

the formation rules for this fragment of a formal language

consisting of a performative statement, or a performative

for contracting.
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53 Semantics and Inference Rules

tion to tender delivery within 24 hours of acceptance under

a sale on approval is expressed as:
The semantics of a formal language describes the conditions under which each well-formed sentence is true. The

obligation(X: tender delivery(Y,Goods,Contract_id) by Date) :-

Y : accept(X,G ds,Contract_id) on Datel,

complete semantics for this fragment of our formal
language is given in Appendix 1.

Date is Datel + 1.

Here we discuss a

segment of that semantics only to explain the methodology.

The last two states, has title and bears_risk, are vital sales

For example, the semantics of the well-formed sentence

contracting concepts. -Usually the two go hand-in-hand;
that is, when title to goods passes from seller to buyer, risk
of loss accompanies it. The basic tenet is that he who
owns the goods must bear the loss if those goods are
damaged, stolen, etc. In a shipment contract, title and risk
of loss pass from the seller to the buyer upon the seller's

describing a performative speech act is:
If a isa < performative statement > where B is in ACTS,

a and 6 are in PLAYERS, e is in GOODS, + is in
DATES, and w is in CONTRACTS,then [a] = true iff [a]
performs the act [B] according to contract [w] regarding
goods [e] on behalf of [6] on [+]·

turning the goods over to a carrier for delivery; in a

The square brackets []are interpreted as "denotes"; thus,

destination contract, title and risk of loss pass to the buyer
when the merchant tenders delivery of goods at a place
specified by the buyer. In a sale on approval, the merchant

[a] means "the semantic value of a" or "the denotation of

holds title and bears risk until the buyer accepts the goods,

as shown in the following inference rule:

a." The semantics defines the conventions for interpreting

performative and declarative statements on the network.
has title(X, Goods, Contract,_id Date) :merchant(X),
soa(Contract-id),
pending(Contract_id, Datel),
Date.=<. Datel.

In order to monitor the status of conversations and the
fulfillment of obligations, our formal language must also

provide inference rules. The possible states to be inferred
include:
obligation: a player has a contractual commitment

to perform a certain act within a specified time

6.

pending: a player has not performed an obliga-

The aim of this paper has been to discuss commercial sales

contracting procedures as formal conversations that can be
conducted over a performative network. Viewing legal
procedures from a linguistic perspective, we have identified
some of the legal speech acts performed in formal conver-

tion, but the deadline for performance has not
elapsed

completed: all obligations have been performed
within the deadline

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

.

sations and have shown how these conversations can be
modeled. We have also begun to outline a formal language through which these conversations can be conducted

breach: an obligation has not been performed
within the deadline

and monitored.

has_title: a player has legal ownership of goods

The formal language discussed here captures only a
simplified view of the three sales contracts. Our future
research will focus on modeling the complexity of contract

bears risk: a player bears risk of loss for goods
should they be damaged, lost, or stolen.

formation and execution; for example, the variations that
arise depending on the classification of the parties (merchant versus consumer, buyer in the ordinary course of
business, etc.) and the type of title document used (negotiable versus non-negotiable documents of title). Our goal
is to develop a system that supports the performance of
business procedures as well as EDI supports the transmis-

The first four states (obligation, pending, completed, and
breach) are common to all contractual situations. These

states are inferred from the database of events. For
example, a contract is pending on Datel if there is an
obligation to be performed by Date2, but Datel precedes

Date2. In Prolog notation, this inference rule is expressed

sion of standard business forms.

as 7
pending(Contract, Datel):obligation(X: Act(Y,Goods, Contract) by Date2),
not (X : Act(Y,Goods, Contract) on Datel,
Datel.<. Date2.

We foresee that EDI formats can be used to represent and
to transmit any legal documents required to complete the

procedures our network hopes to support. Thus, future
research will also investigate EDI and its role in conducting formal conversations on a performative network.
Currently, it is not clear whether EDI transmissions are
informative or performative. In fact, the American Bar

The state obligation refers to individual acts, not contracts.

Thus, an inference rule giving the deadline for each
obligatory act is needed. The inference rule for the obliga-

Association has commissioned a special task force to study
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Fodor, J. A. "Meaning, Convention, and The Blue Book."
In J. V. Canfield, Editor, Afeaning. New York: Garland
Publishing, 1986, pp. 87-108.

legal issues raised by electronic messaging. A report of
this task force notes that "businesses using electronic

messaging systems [e.g., EDI] may...face unacceptable risks
that their transactions may be unenforceable" and that
"electronic messaging systems do not necessarily provide
the requisite legal certainty to support unfettered use in
business transactions" (Baum, Boss and Fry 1988). These

Hintikka, J. "Language-Games." In J. V. Canfield, Editor,
Meaning. New York: Garland Publishing, 1986, pp. 231252.

problems arise because it is not clear that EDI transmissions constitute the legal speech acts discussed earlier in
this paper.

Howell, R, A.; Allison, J. R.; and Prentice, R. A. Business
Law: Text and Cases, Fourth Edition. Chicago, Illinois:
The Dryden Press, 1988.

The performative framework in which formal conversations
are conducted in our approach seeks to avoid these
problems by making explicit the meaning and effects of the

Kahn, R. E.; Vezza, A.; and Roth, A. D. Electronic Mail
and Message Systems. American Federation of Information Processing Societies, Inc., 1981.

agents' acts. Ultimately, we hope to complement EDI by
using information technology both to support business

Kimbrough, S. 0., and Lee, R. M. "Logic Modeling: A

people as they conduct formal conversations and to
monitor the fulfillment of their commitments.

Tool for Management Science.' Decision Support Systems, Volume 4, 1988, pp. 3-16.
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APPENDIX 1

SEMANTICS
If a is an <performative statement> where B is in ACTS, x and 6 are in PLAYERS, € is in GOODS, + is in DATES,
and 7 is in CONTRACTS,

then[c] = true
iff [X] performs the act [B] according to [7] regarding goods [E] on behalf of [6] on [¢].
If a is a <pending expression> where B is in ACTS, X and 6 are in PLAYERS,

7 is in CONTRAdrs,
then[a] = true

is in GOODS, + is in DATES, and

iff [X] has not fulfilled his obligation according to [7] to perform act [B] regarding goods [E] on behalf of [6]
on or before date [0] and date [(M has not yet elapsed.
If ck is a <completed expression> where B is in ACTS, X and 6 are in PLAYERS, € is in GOODS, + is in DATES,
and 7 6 in CONTR UTS,
then[a] = true
iff [X] has fulfilled his obligation according to [7] to perform act [B] regarding goods [E]on behalf of [6] on or
before date [¢].

Ifaisa <breach expression> where B is in ACTS, X and 6 are in PLAYERS, c is in GOODS, + is in DATES, and
7 is in CONTRA©TS,
then[a] = true
iff [X] has an obligation according to [7] to perform act [B] regarding goods [c] on behalf of [6] on or before
date [+], and date [+] has elapsed.
If a is an < obligation expression > where Bisin ACIS, xand 6 arein PLAYERS, € is in GOODS, + is in DATES,

and 7 is in CONTRACTS,
then[a] = true
iff [X] has an obligation according to [7] to perform act [B] regarding goods [f] on behalf of [6] on or before
date [t]

If a is a <title_expression> where B is in PLAYERS, X is in GOODS, 6 is in CONTRACTS and f is in DATES,
then [a] = true
iff [B] has legal ownership of [x] under [6] on date [E]
If cr is a < risk_expression> where B is in PLAYERS, X is in GOODS, 6 is in CONTRACTS, and · E is in DATES,

then [o] = true

iff [B] incurs the loss under [6] if [x] are lost or damaged on date [f].
If a is a < date>, then [a] is an element in DATES.
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